Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7363
Authors: Vincenzo Galasso; Tommaso Nannicini
Abstract: Is electoral competition good for political selection? To address this issue, we introduce a theoretical model in which ideological parties select candidates between party loyalists and experts, and allocate them into the electoral districts. Non-ideological voters, who care about national and local policies, strongly prefer experts. We show that parties compete on good politicians by allocating them to the most contestable districts. Empirical evidence on Italian members of parliament confirms this prediction. We find that politicians with higher ex-ante quality - as measured by years of schooling, previous market income, and local government experience - are more likely to run in a contestable district. Indeed, despite being different on average, the characteristics of politicians belonging to opposite parties converge to high-quality levels in close races. Furthermore, politicians elected in contestable districts make fewer absences in parliament; this is shown to be driven more by a selection effect than by reelection incentives.
Keywords: political competition; political selection; probabilistic voting
JEL Codes: D72; H00
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Electoral competition (D72) | Better political selection (D72) |
| Electoral competition (D72) | Higher-quality candidates allocated to contestable districts (D79) |
| Higher-quality candidates allocated to contestable districts (D79) | Higher-quality politicians elected (D72) |
| Political competition (D72) | Enhanced selection of high-quality politicians (D79) |
| Higher-quality politicians elected (D72) | Lower absenteeism rates in parliament (J22) |
| Electoral competition (D72) | Higher levels of engagement and productivity in parliament (H11) |