Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7320
Authors: Hans Gersbach
Abstract: The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we show that the power of elections as a selection and incentive device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents. A higher vote threshold makes it impossible for office-holders of low ability to pool with more able office-holders in order to be reelected. As a consequence, the average ability of reelected politicians and the average effort level tends to increase. The socially optimal threshold can be set by the public. Alternatively, one could allow candidates to compete with individual vote thresholds.
Keywords: effort; elections; incumbents; political contracts; selection; vote share thresholds
JEL Codes: D7; D82; H4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| higher vote thresholds (D72) | average ability of reelected politicians (D72) |
| higher vote thresholds (D72) | average effort of officeholders (D73) |
| higher vote thresholds (D72) | prevent low-ability incumbents from pooling with high-ability incumbents (D79) |