Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7213
Authors: Lars E. O. Svensson
Abstract: I report some personal views and reflections on transparency experiences and transparency challenges following my first year and a half as Deputy Governor at Sveriges Riksbank regarding (1) flexible inflation targeting, (2) the role of transparency in inflation targeting and committee decisions on instrument-rate paths, (3) the management of interest-rate expectations, and (4) the publishing of attributed minutes. I also mention some future developments and improvements in transparency and flexible inflation targeting that I believe would be desirable.
Keywords: inflation targeting; interest rate path; transparency
JEL Codes: E42; E43; E52; E58
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| transparency in monetary policy (E52) | effectiveness of managing expectations (D84) |
| effectiveness of managing expectations (D84) | outcomes for inflation and the real economy (E31) |
| transparency about future interest rates and inflation forecasts (E47) | private-sector expectations (E69) |
| publication of attributed minutes (Y20) | increased accountability and preparation among board members (G34) |
| increased accountability and preparation among board members (G34) | quality of discussions and decisions made by the monetary policy committee (E58) |