Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7196
Authors: Matthias Doepke; Fabrizio Zilibotti
Abstract: Child labor is a persistent phenomenon in many developing countries. In recent years, support has been growing among rich-country governments and consumer groups for the use of trade policies, such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards, to reduce child labor in poor countries. In this paper, we discuss research on the long-run implications of such policies. In particular, we demonstrate that such measures may have the unintended side effect of lowering domestic support for banning child labor within developing countries, and thus may contribute to the persistence of the child-labor problem.
Keywords: child labor; international labor standards; trade sanctions; political economy
JEL Codes: J20
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Trade sanctions (F51) | Lower domestic support for child labor regulation (J88) |
| Trade sanctions (F51) | Shift of child labor from export sectors to domestic sectors (J89) |
| Shift of child labor from export sectors to domestic sectors (J89) | Diminished competition between child and adult workers (J29) |
| Diminished competition between child and adult workers (J29) | Erosion of incentive for adult workers to support child labor restrictions (J89) |
| Trade sanctions (F51) | Reduce return to education (I26) |
| Reduce return to education (I26) | Fewer workers sending their children to school (I21) |
| Fewer workers sending their children to school (I21) | Shrinking constituency supporting child labor restrictions (J88) |