Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7168
Authors: Simeon Djankov; Rafael La Porta; Florencio López-de-Silanes; Andrei Shleifer
Abstract: We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
Keywords: business interests; conflict of interest; disclosure; politicians
JEL Codes: H7
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| public disclosure of financial and conflict of interest information by politicians (G38) | lower perceived corruption (H57) |
| public disclosure (G38) | accountability mechanisms (G38) |
| public disclosure of financial and conflict of interest information by politicians (G38) | lower perceived corruption in democratic countries (D73) |
| public disclosure laws focusing on sources of assets and activities (G38) | reduction in perceived corruption (H57) |
| confidential disclosure (Y50) | higher perceived corruption (H57) |