Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7121
Authors: Pascal Courty; Do Han Kim; Gerald Marschke
Abstract: Using data from a large, U.S. federal job training program, we investigate whether enrolment incentives that exogenously vary the ?shadow prices? for serving different demographic subgroups of clients influence case workers? intake decisions. We show that case workers enroll more clients from subgroups whose shadow prices increase but select at the margin weaker-performing members from those subgroups. We conclude that enrolment incentives curb cream-skimming across subgroups leaving a residual potential for cream-skimming within a subgroup.
Keywords: bureaucrat behavior; creamskimming; enrolment incentives; performance measurement; public organizations
JEL Codes: H72; J33; L14
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| performance adjustment weights (PAW) (J33) | enrolment shares from demographic subgroups (J19) |
| performance adjustment weights (PAW) (J33) | fraction of enrollees from demographic subgroups (I24) |
| increase in enrolment (I23) | average performance outcomes of enrollees (I21) |
| performance adjustment weights (PAW) adjustments (J33) | observed enrolment patterns (I24) |
| enrolment incentives (M52) | creamskimming across subgroups (G52) |
| creamskimming within subgroups (G52) | enrolment outcomes (I24) |