Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7023
Authors: Achim Wambach
Abstract: If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction than in an ascending auction.
Keywords: descending auction; dutch auction; first price sealed bid auction; information acquisition
JEL Codes: D44; D82; D83
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Auction Format (D44) | Information Acquisition (D83) |
| Descending Auction (D44) | Information Acquisition (D83) |
| Ascending Auction (D44) | Information Acquisition (D83) |
| Information Acquisition (D83) | Strategic Behavior of Bidders (D44) |
| Descending Auction (D44) | Strategic Behavior of Bidders (D44) |
| First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (D44) | Strategic Behavior of Bidders (D44) |