Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6968
Authors: Jonneke Bolhaar; Maarten Lindeboom; Bas van der Klaauw
Abstract: We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate that moral hazard is not important. Furthermore, we find strong evidence for advantageous selection, largely driven by heterogeneity in education, income and health preferences. Finally, we show that ignoring dynamics and unobserved fixed effects changes the results dramatically.
Keywords: advantageous selection; health care utilization; moral hazard; panel data; supplementary private health insurance
JEL Codes: C33; D82; G22; I11
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| moral hazard (G52) | health care utilization (I11) |
| education (I29) | supplementary private health insurance (I13) |
| education (I29) | health risks (I12) |
| education (I29) | health care utilization (I11) |
| income (E25) | supplementary private health insurance (I13) |
| health (I19) | supplementary private health insurance (I13) |