Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6898
Authors: Giovanni Facchini; Anna Maria Mayda; Prachi Mishra
Abstract: While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labour unions are more important.
Keywords: immigration; immigration policy; interest groups; political economy
JEL Codes: F22; J61
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Lobbying expenditures by organized labor (J51) | Restrictiveness of migration policy (F22) |
| Lobbying expenditures by business groups (D72) | Restrictiveness of migration policy (F22) |
| Restrictiveness of migration policy (F22) | Number of immigrants (J11) |
| Lobbying expenditures by business groups per native worker (J39) | Number of visas per native worker (J69) |
| Union density (J50) | Number of visas per native worker (J69) |