Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP685
Authors: Giorgio Basevi; Flavio Delbono; Marco Mariotti
Abstract: The paper analyses a situation in which negotiations take place between a party consisting of a single decision-maker and a party consisting of a group of two decision-makers. The latter, in setting its proposal to the opponent party, may act cooperatively or non-cooperatively within itself. The model seems to be applicable to many cases such as wage negotiations with a group of different workers' unions, disarmament negotiations with a group of allied countries, etc. In the paper, however, the model is directly applied to the case of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. In this case the authors' conjecture is that much of the difficulty currently experienced in reaching an agreement stems from the often non-cooperative nature of the preliminary agreement within the European Community required before it can arrive at a definite proposal for negotiation with other countries.
Keywords: bargaining; GATT negotiations
JEL Codes: C70; F13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Noncooperative character of intra-EC negotiations (F55) | Deadlock in GATT negotiations (D74) |
| Intra-EC negotiation dynamics (F55) | Ability of EC to present a united front to external parties (F55) |
| Internal divisions within the EC (F36) | Complication of negotiation process (C78) |
| Noncooperative internal dynamics (C72) | Less favorable proposals for reaching agreements with the US (F13) |