Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6769
Authors: Aner Sela
Abstract: We study two-stage all-pay auctions with two identical prizes. In each stage, players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the equilibrium strategies where players' marginal values for the prizes are either declining or inclining.
Keywords: All-pay auctions; Multiprize contests
JEL Codes: D44; D82; J31; J41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| declining marginal values (D46) | higher expected payoff in the first stage (C73) |
| inclining marginal values (D46) | lower expected payoff in the first stage (D80) |
| highest marginal value (D46) | higher expected payoff (G40) |
| lower marginal values compared to opponent (D43) | positive expected payoff in first stage (D81) |
| equilibrium strategies in second stage resemble one-prize all-pay auctions (D44) | complexity in first stage dynamics (C69) |