Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6768
Authors: Todd Kaplan; Aner Sela
Abstract: We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be ineffective, namely, the chance of low ability candidates participating in the contest might be higher than the chance of high ability candidates participating in the contest (and winning). However, by imposing a costly requirement (fee) on the winner of the contest, one can guarantee that the contest will be effective.
Keywords: All-pay auctions; Contests; Entry costs
JEL Codes: D44; O31; O33
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| candidate ability (D79) | chance of participation (C90) |
| chance of participation (C90) | effectiveness of political contests (D72) |
| costly requirement fee (R48) | chance of participation (C90) |
| costly requirement fee (R48) | effectiveness of political contests (D72) |
| decreasing number of candidates (D79) | total expenditures (H59) |