Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6763
Authors: Hans Gersbach
Abstract: Although they would yield social benefits, some political projects may not be implemented in democracies. Prominent examples are the reform of European labour markets, the reduction of government debt or the reduction of greenhouse gases. We suggest introducing political contracts to make liberal democracy more efficient without altering its fundamental values. Furthermore, such contracts can foster the public's trust in politics. We discuss four archetypes of political contracts and ways of implementing them. We outline the certification and control procedures for political contracts and address the major concerns arising with regard to contractual democracy.
Keywords: contractual democracy; elections; political contracts
JEL Codes: D7; H1; H4; K1
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| political contracts (L14) | political accountability (D72) |
| political contracts (L14) | reelection rates (D72) |
| threshold contracts (L14) | incumbency advantage (D72) |
| threshold contracts (L14) | fulfilling campaign promises (D72) |
| political contracts (L14) | public trust (H82) |