Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6711
Authors: John Micklewright; Gyula Nagy
Abstract: The administration of benefits is a relatively neglected aspect of the analysis of disincentive effects of unemployment benefit systems. We investigate this issue with a field experiment in Hungary involving random assignment of benefit claimants to treatment and control groups, a method of policy evaluation that is still rare in Europe. Treatment, involving a tightening of claim administration, has quite a large effect on durations on benefit of women aged 30 and over, while we find no effect for younger women or men.
Keywords: field experiment; Hungary; job search; unemployment insurance
JEL Codes: J64; J65; P23
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| job search monitoring (J68) | increased search activity (D83) |
| unemployment duration (J64) | job offers (M51) |
| treatment group (women aged 30 and over) (J78) | increased search activity (D83) |
| job search monitoring (J68) | unemployment duration (J64) |
| treatment group (women aged 30 and over) (J78) | unemployment duration (J64) |