Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6666
Authors: Pablo Braasgarza; Teresa Garcamuoz; Shoshana Neuman
Abstract: This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).
Keywords: carrot-stick; economics of religion; high stakes punishment and rewards
JEL Codes: C91; D64; Z13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| belief in heaven (Z12) | church attendance (Z12) |
| belief in heaven (Z12) | prayer habits (Z12) |
| disbelief in heaven (Y70) | church attendance (Z12) |
| disbelief in heaven (Y70) | prayer habits (Z12) |
| belief in hell (Z12) | church attendance (Z12) |
| belief in hell (Z12) | prayer habits (Z12) |
| lack of belief in heaven (Y70) | religious practice (Z12) |
| lack of belief in hell (Y70) | religious practice (Z12) |