Optimal Taxation with Joint Production of Agriculture and Rural Amenities

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6615

Authors: Georges Casamatta; Gordon Rausser; Leo K. Simon

Abstract: We show that, when there is joint production of an agricultural good and rural amenities, the first-best allocation of resources can be implemented with a tax on the agricultural good and some subsidies on the production factors (land and labour). The use of a subsidy on the agricultural good can only be explained by the desire of the policymaker to redistribute income from the consumers to the farmers.

Keywords: joint production; rural amenities

JEL Codes: H21; H23; Q10


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Tax on agricultural goods (Q18)Optimal resource allocation (D61)
Subsidy on agricultural output (Q12)Redistribution of income towards farmers (D33)
High subsidy rates (H23)Income redistribution towards farmers (H23)

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