Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6555
Authors: Jean-Pierre Danthine; John B. Donaldson
Abstract: We study the dynamic general equilibrium of an economy where risk averse shareholders delegate the management of the firm to risk averse managers. The optimal contract has two main components: an incentive component corresponding to a non-tradable equity position and a variable 'salary' component indexed to the aggregate wage bill and to aggregate dividends. Tying a manager's compensation to the performance of her own firm ensures that her interests are aligned with the goals of firm owners and that maximizing the discounted sum of future dividends will be her objective. Linking managers' compensation to overall economic performance is also required to make sure that managers use the appropriate stochastic discount factor to value those future dividends.
Keywords: incentives; optimal contracting; stochastic discount factor
JEL Codes: E32; E44
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Performance-based compensation (J33) | Manager's decision-making (D80) |
| Firm-level performance + Aggregate economic performance (L25) | Manager's compensation structure (M52) |
| Optimal contract (D86) | Unexpected compensation outcomes (J33) |