Antidumping Sunset Reviews: The Uneven Reach of WTO Disciplines

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6502

Authors: Olivier Cadot; Jaime de Melo; Bolormaa Tumurchudur

Abstract: The paper uses a new database on Anti-Dumping measures worldwide to assess whether the 1995 Uruguay Round Agreement on AD sunset reviews had any effect. Estimates from a count of revocations for a panel of AD-using countries over 1979-2005 show that a five-year cycle is more apparent after the WTO agreement than before, with the marginal propensity to revoke AD measures at five years jumping from 0-2% to 45%. A survival analysis of AD measures confirms that those covered by the agreement stick on average for shorter periods, but a semi-parametric difference-in-difference approach suggests that compliance was at least partly voluntary rather than forced by the agreement?s discipline. Moreover, much of the adjustment to the WTO?s new rules on sunset reviews came from small and new users of Anti-Dumping rules rather than the traditional and large ones.

Keywords: antidumping; sunset reviews; survival analysis; WTO

JEL Codes: F13


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
adjustment to WTO sunset review rules (F13)behavior of smaller and newer users of antidumping measures (F18)
WTO agreement (F13)adjustment patterns of smaller and newer users of antidumping rules (F18)
WTO agreement (F13)marginal propensity to revoke AD measures (E00)
WTO agreement (F13)compliance with WTO rules (F13)
WTO compliance (F13)duration of AD measures (C41)

Back to index