Per un pugno di dollari: A First Look at the Price Elasticity of Patents

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6499

Authors: Gaetan de Rassenfosse; Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie

Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of patent filing fees requested by the member states of the European Patent Convention (EPC). We provide a first empirical evidence showing that the fee elasticity of the demand for priority applications is negative and significant. Given the strong variation in absolute fees and in fees per capita across countries, this result witnesses a suboptimal treatment of inventors across European countries and suggests that fees should be considered as an integral part of an IP policy, especially in the current context of worrying backlogs. In addition, we show that the transfer rate of domestic priority filings to the EPO increases with the duration of membership to the EPO and the GDP per capita of a country, suggesting that member states experience a learning curve within the EPC. The high heterogeneity in the transfer rates casts some doubts on the practice that consists in relying on filings at the EPO or at the USPTO to assess innovative performance of countries.

Keywords: fees; patent filing; price elasticity

JEL Codes: O30; O31; O38; O57


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Patent filing fees (O38)Demand for patents (O34)
Demand for patents (O34)National priority filings (R28)
National priority filings (R28)Transfer rate to EPO (F16)
Wealth of a country (O57)Transfer rate to EPO (F16)
Duration of membership in EPC (F36)Transfer rate to EPO (F16)

Back to index