Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6498
Authors: Fernando A. Broner; Alberto Martin; Jaume Ventura
Abstract: There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies.But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded. This paper shows that trading in secondary markets counteracts the effects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence of further frictions, restores efficiency.
Keywords: default; enforcement; secondary markets; sovereign risk; weak law enforcement
JEL Codes: F34; F36; G15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| weak enforcement institutions (P37) | market inefficiency (G14) |
| secondary markets (G10) | government enforcement behavior (G38) |
| secondary markets (G10) | optimal consumption plans (D15) |
| secondary markets (G10) | negative impact of enforcement mistakes (K42) |