Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6497
Authors: Hans Gersbach
Abstract: In this paper we introduce vote-share contracts. Such contracts contain a vote-share threshold that incumbents must reach in order to be reelected. In a simple model, we illustrate the working of vote-share contracts. Such vote-share contracts curb socially detrimental incumbency advantages by improving the average ability level of re-elected politicians and also increase effort. We show that the socially optimal vote-share threshold for incumbents is larger than one half. Competing candidates offer vote-share contracts with socially optimal thresholds.
Keywords: Elections; Political Contracts; Voteshare Thresholds
JEL Codes: D7; D82; H4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| higher voteshare threshold (D72) | increased effort (D29) |
| voteshare contracts (D72) | increased effort (D29) |
| voteshare contracts (D72) | higher quality of reelected politicians (D72) |
| higher voteshare threshold (D72) | higher quality of reelected politicians (D72) |