Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6470
Authors: Chryssi Giannitsarou; Flavio Toxvaerd
Abstract: The present paper contributes to the literature on dynamic games with strategic complementarities, in two interrelated ways. First, we identify a class of dynamic complete information games in which intertemporal complementarities and multiple equilibria can be fruitfully analyzed. Second, we extend the analysis to an incomplete information framework, where results from the literature on global games can be applied to select a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in monotone strategies.
Keywords: dynamic global games; dynamic supermodular games; endogenous cycles
JEL Codes: C73; D43; E32
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| higher actions of other players (C73) | higher action for the remaining player more desirable (C73) |
| past actions (G14) | current decisions (D70) |
| initial conjecture about high activity (D29) | high activity equilibrium outcome (D51) |
| intertemporal complementarities (D15) | contemporaneous complementarities (D10) |