Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6417
Authors: Emmanuelle Auriol; Robert J. Garybobo
Abstract: We propose a normative theory of the number of representatives based on a stylized model of a representative democracy. We derive a simple formula, a "square-root theory" which gives the number of representatives in parliament as proportional to the square root of total population. Simple econometric tests of the formula on a sample of a 100 countries yield surprisingly good results. These results provide a benchmark for a discussion of the appropriateness of the number of representatives in some countries. It seems that the United States have too few representatives, while France and Italy have too many. The excess number of representatives matters: it is positively correlated with indicators of red tape, barriers to entrepreneurship and perceived corruption.
Keywords: constitution; design; incentives; number of representatives; representative democracy
JEL Codes: D7; H11; H40
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Population size (J11) | Number of representatives (D72) |
| Excess number of representatives (D72) | Red tape (D73) |
| Excess number of representatives (D72) | Barriers to entrepreneurship (L26) |
| Excess number of representatives (D72) | Perceived corruption (H57) |
| Number of representatives (D72) | Governance indicators (G38) |
| Predicted number of representatives (D72) | Actual number of representatives (D72) |
| Historical rigidity in political institutions (D72) | Representation quality (L15) |