Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6386
Authors: Emmanuel Saez
Abstract: We examine the effects of presentation and information on the take-up of financial subsidies for retirement saving in a large randomized experiment carried out with H&R Block. The subsidies raise take-up and contributions, with larger effects when the subsidy is characterized as a matching contribution rather than an equivalent-value tax credit (or cash back), and when filers are informed before the tax season about the subsidy. The results imply that both pure incentives and the presentation of those incentives affect consumer choices.
Keywords: Field Experiment; Retirement Savings Incentives
JEL Codes: H31
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| matching offer (C78) | takeup of IRA contributions (D14) |
| advance notification (Y20) | IRA takeup rates (H26) |
| presentation of incentives (M52) | consumer choices (D10) |
| match presentation (C78) | takeup of IRA contributions (D14) |