Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6333
Authors: Kai A. Konrad; Wolfgang Leininger
Abstract: We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.
Keywords: collective action; defence; distributional conflict; freeriding; norms; war
JEL Codes: D72; D74; H11; H41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| norms (D63) | distributional conflict (D74) |
| norms (D63) | collective action (D70) |
| clan size (D71) | defense effectiveness (H56) |
| norm adherence (F55) | equilibrium stability (C62) |
| norms (D63) | cooperation (P13) |