Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6298
Authors: Benjamin Jones; Benjamin Olken
Abstract: Assassinations are a persistent feature of the political landscape. Using a new data set of assassination attempts on all world leaders from 1875 to 2004, we exploit inherent randomness in the success or failure of assassination attempts to identify assassination?s effects. We find that, on average, successful assassinations of autocrats produce sustained moves toward democracy. We also find that assassinations affect the intensity of small-scale conflicts. The results document a contemporary source of institutional change, inform theories of conflict, and show that small sources of randomness can have a pronounced effect on history.
Keywords: assassinations; institutions; war
JEL Codes: D74; F52; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| successful assassinations of autocrats (P39) | increase in the likelihood of a transition to democracy (P39) |
| successful assassinations of autocrats (P39) | increase in the probability of future leadership transitions occurring through regular means (J62) |
| successful assassinations of autocrats (P39) | institutional change (O17) |
| successful assassinations of autocrats (P39) | intensify small-scale conflicts (D74) |
| successful assassinations of autocrats (P39) | hasten the end of high-intensity conflicts (D74) |
| failed assassination attempts (Y50) | slightly reduce the likelihood of democratic change (D72) |
| failed assassination attempts (Y50) | potentially lead to increased suppression (Y50) |
| successful assassinations (Y50) | institutional change (O17) |