Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6282
Authors: Simon J. Evenett
Abstract: The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations was suspended for almost six months in 2006. The purpose of this paper is to ask what scholars can learn about the political economy of reciprocal trade liberalisation from this suspension. Specifically, four potential explanations for this suspension are examined and, in turn, these suggest a number of questions that researchers and interested analysts may wish to pursue in the future.
Keywords: Doha Round; Multilateral Trade; Reform; Reciprocal Trade Reform; Trade Policy; WTO
JEL Codes: F13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| perceived low costs of suspension (H43) | prioritization of unilateral and regional trade agreements (F13) |
| domestic political constraints (D72) | incompatible levels of ambition for agricultural trade liberalization (F13) |
| EU's agricultural reform program + US's reluctance to reduce domestic support (Q18) | stalemate in negotiations (D74) |
| organizational structure of negotiations (L14) | complications in consensus-building (D70) |
| veto power among numerous members (D72) | perceptions of exclusion among smaller nations (F55) |
| miscalculations in negotiating strategies (C78) | hindered progress (O17) |