Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6281
Authors: Vincent Anesi; Philippe De Donder
Abstract: We develop a model where voters differ in their exogenous income and in their ideological views regarding what we call 'racism'. Electoral competition, modelled à la Levy (2004), takes place between (one or several) parties which propose platforms consisting of both an ideological and an economic dimension. Our objective is to explain the emergence of racist policies when a majority of voters is not racist, and to understand the role played by political parties in this emergence. We first show that, in a pure citizen-candidate model where parties are absent, the only equilibrium consists of the non-racist policy. We then show that allowing for the formation of political parties generates equilibria with racist policies. Finally, our main result states that, if the economic issue is sufficiently salient compared to the ideological one, all equilibria consist of a racist policy, and that the lowest degree of racism of these policies increases with the proportion of poor people in the economy.
Keywords: Electoral Competition; Polarization; Political Parties; Salience
JEL Codes: D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| absence of parties (Y70) | nonracist outcomes (J15) |
| party formation (D79) | policy outcomes (D78) |
| economic issue more salient than ideological one (P39) | all equilibrium policies will be racist (J78) |
| proportion of poor voters in the electorate (D72) | degree of racism (J15) |
| income polarization (D31) | emergence of racist policies (J18) |