Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6269
Authors: Natalie Chen; Paola Conconi; Carlo Perroni
Abstract: Bargaining theory suggests that married women who experience a relative improvement in their labour market position should experience a comparative gain within their marriage. However, if renegotiation possibilities are limited by institutional mechanisms that achieve long-term commitment, the opposite may be true, particularly if women are specialized in household activities and the labour market allows comparatively more flexibility in their labour supply responses. Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel indeed shows that, as long as renegotiation opportunities are limited, comparatively better wages for women exacerbate their 'double burden' of market and household work.
Keywords: Bargaining; Marriage; Renegotiation
JEL Codes: D1; J2; J3
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Comparative improvement in women's labor market opportunities (J79) | Favorable outcome within the household (D13) |
| Higher wages for women (J31) | Increase in market effort (D49) |
| Higher wages for women (J31) | Double burden of market and household work (D13) |
| Increase in women's wages (J31) | Decrease in reported satisfaction (D12) |
| Higher rematching costs and stricter social norms (C78) | Stronger adverse effects of wage increases on women's satisfaction (J31) |
| More children and stricter social norms (J13) | Greater negative impact on satisfaction from wage increases (J31) |
| Men's wage improvements (J31) | Increase in men's satisfaction (J12) |
| Women's wage increases (J31) | Divergence in welfare effects across genders (J16) |