The Invisible Hand in Corporate Governance

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6256

Authors: Vidhi Chhaochharia; Luc Laeven

Abstract: We evaluate the impact of firm-level corporate governance provisions on the valuation of firms in a large cross-section of countries. Unlike previous work, we distinguish between governance provisions that are set at the country-level and those that are adopted at the firm-level. We find that governance provisions adopted by firms beyond those imposed by regulations and common practices among firms in the country have a strong, positive effect on firm valuation. Our results indicate that, despite the costs associated with improving corporate governance at the firm level, many firms choose to adopt governance provisions beyond what can be considered the norm in the country, and these improvements in corporate governance have a positive effect on firm valuation. These findings contribute to the current debate on the extent to which corporate governance reform can be left to the ?invisible hand? of the market or requires government interference.

Keywords: corporate governance; firm valuation; government policy; laissez faire

JEL Codes: G3


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Governance provisions adopted by firms (G38)Firm valuation (G32)
Deviations from country-average governance score (O17)Firm valuation (G32)
One standard deviation increase in governance provisions in 2003 (G38)Firm valuation (G32)

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