Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6240
Authors: Theresa Fahrenberger; Hans Gersbach
Abstract: We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply large delay costs.
Keywords: bargaining in legislatures; Baron-Ferejohn model; open rules; three-group equilibria; four-group equilibria
JEL Codes: D7
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| size of the legislature (D72) | type of equilibrium (D50) |
| type of equilibrium (D50) | delay costs (D25) |
| agendasetter's proposal structure (C78) | outcomes of legislative process (D72) |