Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6163
Authors: Andrea Mattozzi; Antonio Merlo
Abstract: In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector. We show that a political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that it could afford to recruit better individuals who would like to become politicians. We argue that this finding may contribute to explain the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of mediocre people.
Keywords: parties; political recruitment; politicians
JEL Codes: D72; J44; J45
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Political Party's Recruitment Strategy (D79) | Quality of Recruits (mediocre politicians) (D73) |
| Political Party's Recruitment Strategy (D79) | Lobbying Sector's Wage Offers (J31) |
| Outside Options for Candidates (D79) | Political Party's Recruitment Decisions (D79) |