Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6150
Authors: Winand Emons; Claude Fluet
Abstract: An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favour at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The arbiter's ability to remain uninformed as well as sequential testifying makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence.
Keywords: adversarial; costly state falsification; evidence production; inquisitorial; multisender game
JEL Codes: D82; K41; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Number of testimonies (C90) | Accuracy of adjudication (K41) |
| Cost of testifying (K41) | Number of testimonies (C90) |
| Structure of testimony (Y20) | Accuracy of adjudication (K41) |
| Number of testimonies (C90) | Distortion of evidence (H31) |
| Sequential testimonies (C22) | Falsification (B41) |