Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP6141
Authors: Benjamin Chiao; Josh Lerner; Jean Tirole
Abstract: This paper empirically explores standard-setting organizations? policy choices. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2006), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker when there is only a limited number of SSOs.
Keywords: forum shopping; innovation; licensing; standardization
JEL Codes: L2; O3
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Orientation of SSOs towards technology sponsors (L24) | Level of concessions demanded from sponsors (Z23) |
| Sponsor-friendliness of SSOs (Z23) | Quality of the standards (L15) |
| Provisions mandating royalty-free licensing (L17) | Disclosure requirements (G38) |
| Concessions demanded from sponsors (Z23) | User-friendliness (L15) |
| Fewer SSOs in a technological subfield (C20) | Weaker relationship between concessions and user-friendliness (L15) |