Voting on the Adoption of a Common Currency

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP595

Authors: Alessandra Casella

Abstract: Two countries adopting a common currency share the same monetary policy and save on transaction costs. This paper studies the impact of these two factors on the composition of markets. The establishment of a monetary union alters the boundaries between domestic and international markets and triggers distributional effects, creating disagreement among citizens over the desirability of the union. The outcome of a referendum on the choice between national currencies and monetary union depends on the country's level of development, suggesting that a common currency will be favoured by a majority of traders in both countries only at a particular stage.

Keywords: common currency; voting; transaction costs

JEL Codes: F15; F33


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
common currency (F36)reduced transaction costs (D23)
reduced transaction costs (D23)increased size of international markets (F69)
common currency (F36)increased size of international markets (F69)
monetary union (F36)distributional effects (D39)
level of development (O11)voting behavior regarding common currency (F36)
inflation (E31)returns from trade (F19)
higher inflation countries (E31)favor monetary unification (F45)

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