Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5794
Authors: Giancarlo Spagnolo
Abstract: The paper reviews the recent evolution of leniency programs for cartels in the US and EU, surveys their theoretical economic analyses, and discusses the empirical and experimental evidence available, also looking briefly at related experiences of rewarding whistleblowers in other fields of law enforcement. It concludes with a list of desiderata for leniency and whistleblower reward programs, simple suggestions how to improve current ones, and an agenda for future research. The issues discussed appear relevant to the fight of other forms of multiagent organized crime - like auditor-manager collusion, financial fraud, or corruption - that share with cartels the crucial features that well designed leniency and whistleblower programs exploit.
Keywords: amnesty; antitrust; cartels; collusion; competition policy; corporate crime; corruption; deterrence; immunity; leniency; organized crime; self reporting; snitches; whistleblowers
JEL Codes: K31; K42; L13; L44
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Leniency Programs (K21) | Decrease in Cartel Stability (L12) |
| Decrease in Cartel Stability (L12) | Increase in Self-Reporting (C80) |
| Leniency Programs (K21) | Increase in Self-Reporting (C80) |
| Leniency Programs (K21) | Successful Prosecutions (K42) |
| Leniency Programs (K21) | Increase in Detected Cartels (K21) |