Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5622
Authors: Francesco Caselli; Wilbur John Coleman II
Abstract: We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy's resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources.
Keywords: Ethnic Distance; Exploitation
JEL Codes: P48; Q34; Z13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| ethnic diversity (J15) | ability of coalitions to enforce membership (D71) |
| ability of coalitions to enforce membership (D71) | likelihood of conflict (D74) |
| ethnic diversity (J15) | likelihood of conflict (D74) |
| expropriable resources (H13) | likelihood of conflict (D74) |
| infiltration from losing coalition (D74) | likelihood of conflict (D74) |
| ethnic distance (J15) | costs of enforcement (K40) |