Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5579
Authors: Juan D. Carrillo
Abstract: This paper proposes a rule to determine the winner of a soccer match which is different from the traditional penalty shoot-outs at the end of extra time. We show that games can be more attractive if penalties are shot before extra time and the outcome counts only if the tie is preserved during extra time. In general, this rule will promote offense by the team that loses the penalty shoot-outs and it will promote defense by the team that wins the penalty shoot-outs. We provide conditions on the marginal effect of offensive play in the probabilities of scoring and conceding a goal such that the proposed rule dominates the current one. Last, we determine a class of functions that satisfies these conditions. More generally, the paper shows how the ordering of tasks may affect the incentives to exert and allocate effort.
Keywords: effort allocation; implicit incentives; sports economics
JEL Codes: Z0
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| timing of penalty shootouts (C41) | offensive play by team that loses (L21) |
| timing of penalty shootouts (C41) | defensive play by team that wins (Z22) |
| offensive play by team that loses (L21) | excitement of the game (Y60) |
| timing of penalty shootouts (C41) | team strategies (C71) |
| penalty timing (C41) | incentives for offensive play (Z22) |
| penalty timing (C41) | incentives for defensive play (Z22) |