Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5564
Authors: Philip de Jong; Maarten Lindeboom; Bas van der Klaauw
Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.
Keywords: disability insurance; policy evaluation; self-screening; sickness absenteeism
JEL Codes: J28; J65
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| intensified screening (F55) | self-screening behavior (D91) |
| self-screening behavior (D91) | disability insurance applications (G52) |
| intensified screening (F55) | unemployment insurance inflow (J65) |
| intensified screening (F55) | long-term sickness absenteeism (J22) |
| intensified screening (F55) | disability insurance applications (G52) |
| intensified screening (F55) | work resumption during sickness absenteeism (J22) |