Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5474
Authors: Lena Edlund; Nilspetter Lagerlf
Abstract: Marrying individuals' consent has been requirement for marriage in Europe since the Middle Ages - in most of the rest of the world parental consent reigned until at least until the 1950s. This paper investigates the role of consent in marriage for intra-household allocation of resources and growth. We argue that a shift from parental to individual consent moves resources in the same direction, favouring young men and young women over old men. If young adults have greater incentives to invest in child human capital than the old (who will be around fewer periods), this may impact on growth. We formulate a simple endogenous growth model capturing these aspects.
Keywords: arranged marriage; endogenous growth; individual consent; love marriage; parental consent
JEL Codes: J12; O17; O40
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| shift from parental consent (J13) | redistribution of resources from old men to young adults (O15) |
| shift from parental consent (J13) | redistribution of resources from men to women (F63) |
| redistribution of resources from old men to young adults (O15) | positive impact on growth (F69) |
| redistribution of resources from men to women (F63) | higher levels of consumption and investment in child human capital (J24) |
| higher levels of consumption and investment in child human capital (J24) | foster growth (O25) |
| shift from parental to individual consent (K36) | young adults favored in human capital investment (J24) |