Mixing Media with Two-Part Tariffs

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5437

Authors: Steffen Hoernig; Tommaso Valletti

Abstract: We consider a media market where consumers mix content offered by different firms and firms charge two-part tariffs. As compared to pure linear pricing (pay-per-view), firms make higher profits, while consumers are worse off and the allocation is not first-best. We also consider flat subscription fees and show that they make mixing unattractive. Both two-part tariffs and pay-per-view Pareto-dominate flat fees.

Keywords: combinable products; flat fees; pay-per-view; two-part tariffs

JEL Codes: L13; L82


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
two-part tariffs (L90)higher profits (D33)
linear pricing (D41)lower profits (D33)
two-part tariffs (L90)increased revenues from mixing customers (H27)
flat fees (D49)inefficiencies (D61)
two-part tariffs (L90)Pareto improvement in welfare (D69)
flat fees (D49)lower overall welfare (D69)
two-part tariffs (L90)consumers worse off (D11)

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