Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5436
Authors: Ralph Siebert; Georg von Graevenitz
Abstract: This paper is a study of licensing in a patent thicket. In a patent thicket licensing allows firms to avoid hold-up. It will have different effects on firms' R&D incentives depending on whether firms license existing or future patents. Building on a model of a patent portfolio race, firms' choice between these types of licensing contracts is modelled. We find that firms' relationships in product markets and technology space jointly determine the type of licensing contract chosen. We derive several hypotheses and test these. Using data from the semiconductor industry a dynamic panel data model with unobserved heterogeneity and a lagged dependent variable is estimated. A new method suggested by Wooldridge (2005) is employed to estimate a random effects probit model using conditional ML. The hypotheses derived from the theory are confirmed. Based on our results we argue that licensing raises welfare in the patent thicket.
Keywords: holdup problem; innovation; licensing; patent race; patent thicket
JEL Codes: L13; L49; L63
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| blocking strength of patent portfolios (O34) | type of licensing contract chosen (L24) |
| stronger blocking patents (L49) | likelihood of ex-ante licensing when product market competitors (L24) |
| stronger blocking patents (L49) | likelihood of ex-ante licensing when firms are complementors (L24) |
| previous experience with licensing contracts (L24) | transaction costs (D23) |
| previous experience with ex-ante licensing contracts (D45) | probability of choosing ex-ante licensing (D45) |
| additional ex-post licensing contracts (L24) | probability of choosing ex-ante licensing (D45) |