Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5248
Authors: Simon Burgess; Carol Propper; Helen Slater; Deborah Wilson
Abstract: In 1988 the UK government introduced greater accountability into the English state school sector. But the information that schools are required to make public on their pupil achievement is only partial. The paper examines whether accountability measures based on a partial summary of student achievement influence the distribution of student achievement. Since school ratings only incorporate test results via pass rates, schools have incentives to improve the performance of students who are on the margin of meeting these standards, to the detriment of very low achieving or high achieving pupils. Using pupil level data for a cohort of all students in secondary public sector schools in England, we find that this policy reduces the educational gains and exam performance in high stakes exams of very low ability students.
Keywords: educational value added; high stakes exams; school accountability
JEL Codes: D230; I200; I280
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Accountability measures (H83) | Focus on marginal pupils (I24) |
| Focus on marginal pupils (I24) | Reduced educational gains for very low ability students (I24) |
| Increased number of marginal pupils (I24) | Decreased value added for low ability students (D29) |
| Marginal pupils (D43) | Slight gains in competitive environments (D29) |
| Accountability framework (G38) | Lower value added for lowest ability pupils (D29) |
| Accountability framework (G38) | Reduced chances of achieving qualifications for lowest ability pupils (I24) |