Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5201
Authors: Timothy Besley; Rohini Pande; Vijayendra Rao
Abstract: This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics affect politician behaviour while in office. Education increases the chances of selection to public office and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not affect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alter the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information flows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation.
Keywords: Decentralization; India; Political Economy; Public Provision of Private Goods
JEL Codes: H11; H42; O12; O20
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| education (I29) | likelihood of being elected (K16) |
| education (I29) | opportunism (D84) |
| opportunism (D84) | quality of politicians (D72) |
| land ownership (Q15) | selection into office (D79) |
| political connections (D72) | selection into office (D79) |
| political dominance (D72) | resource allocation (H61) |
| information flows (O36) | opportunism (D84) |
| information flows (O36) | targeting of BPL cards (H53) |