Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5186
Authors: Luis Garicano; Richard A. Posner
Abstract: Two recent failures of the United States intelligence system have led to the creation of high-level investigative commissions. The failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted the creation of the 9/11 Commission, and the mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein had retained weapons of mass destruction prompted the creation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. We use insights from organizational economics to analyse the principal organizational issues raised by these commissions.
Keywords: intelligence reform; organizational economics; war on terrorism
JEL Codes: D2; D8; H1; K0; L22; L32
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Organizational structure of the intelligence community (F53) | Herding (C92) |
| Groupthink (C92) | Herding (C92) |
| Lack of information sharing among intelligence agencies (D82) | Failure to anticipate 9/11 attacks (D84) |
| Structure of the FBI (L22) | Inefficiencies in addressing terrorism (H56) |
| Incompatible missions within the FBI (Y50) | Suboptimal performance in intelligence (D29) |
| Centralization of intelligence efforts (H77) | Improved information sharing (O36) |
| Centralization of intelligence efforts (H77) | Increased herding behaviors (C92) |