Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5145
Authors: Patrick W. Schmitz
Abstract: This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more effective. Should one agent be in control in both stages (integration), or should different agents be in charge of the two actions (separation)? Both modes of organization can be explained on the basis of incentive considerations due to moral hazard, without resorting to commitment problems or ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible contracts.
Keywords: contract theory; hidden action; limited liability; moral hazard
JEL Codes: D23; L23; O32
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| control allocation (E61) | agents' incentives (L85) |
| integration (F15) | moral hazard issues (G52) |
| moral hazard issues (G52) | higher rents (R21) |
| separation (Y40) | mitigate incentives to shirk (D82) |
| first stage's outcome (P27) | second stage's effort levels (P30) |
| project value (O22) | choice between integration and separation (F02) |