The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5124

Authors: Winand Emons; Claude Fluet

Abstract: An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favour at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The ability to commit to an adjudication scheme makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence.

Keywords: adversarial; costly state falsification; evidence production; inquisitorial; procedure

JEL Codes: D82; K41; K42


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
number of parties providing testimony (K41)accuracy of adjudication (K41)
ability to commit to an adjudication scheme (K41)likelihood of requiring evidence from parties (K41)
fixed costs of presenting evidence (K41)likelihood of hearing both parties (D72)
procedural costs (K41)decision to gather evidence (D70)

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