Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5092
Authors: Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin
Abstract: The winner of a battle for a throne can either execute or spare the loser; if the loser is spared, he contends the throne in the next period. Executing the losing contender gives the winner an additional quiet period, but then his life is at risk if he loses to some future contender who might be, in equilibrium, too frightened to spare him. The trade-off is analysed within a dynamic complete information game, with, potentially, an infinite number of long-term players. In an equilibrium, decisions to execute predecessors are history-dependent. With a dynastic rule in place, incentives to kill the predecessor are much higher than in non-hereditary dictatorships. The historical part of our analytic narrative contains a detailed analysis of two types of non-democratic succession: hereditary rule of the Osmanli dynasty in the Ottoman Empire in 1281–1922, and non-hereditary military dictatorships in Venezuela in 1830–1964.
Keywords: dictatorship; economic history; positive political theory; succession
JEL Codes: C73; D72; N40
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Execute predecessor (Y60) | Future actions of successors (Y50) |
| Spare predecessor (Y60) | Future actions of successors (Y50) |
| Execute predecessor (Y60) | Retaliation by successors (G34) |
| Spare predecessor (Y60) | Reduced risk of retaliation by successors (G34) |
| Execute predecessor (Y60) | Cycle of violence (J12) |
| Spare predecessor (Y60) | Stability of regimes (C62) |