Monetary Policy with Judgement: Forecast Targeting

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5072

Authors: Lars E. O. Svensson

Abstract: ?Forecast targeting?, forward-looking monetary policy that uses central-bank judgment to construct optimal policy projections of the target variables and the instrument rate, may perform substantially better than monetary policy that disregards judgment and follows a given instrument rule. This is demonstrated in a few examples for two empirical models of the US economy, one forward looking and one backward looking. A complicated infinite-horizon central bank projection model of the economy can be closely approximated by a simple finite system of linear equations, which is easily solved for the optimal policy projections. Optimal policy projections corresponding to the optimal policy under commitment in a timeless perspective can easily be constructed. The whole projection path of the instrument rate is more important than the current instrument setting. The resulting reduced-form reaction function for the current instrument rate is a very complex function of all inputs in the monetary-policy decision process, including the central bank?s judgment. It cannot be summarized as a simple reaction function such as a Taylor rule. Fortunately, it need not be made explicit.

Keywords: forecasts; inflation targeting; optimal monetary policy

JEL Codes: E42; E52; E58


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
central bank judgment (E58)monetary policy performance (E52)
judgmental forecasting (C53)effectiveness of monetary policy (E52)
disregarding judgment (K40)complex reaction function (D79)
central bank judgment (E58)improved outcomes (I14)

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