Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5067
Authors: Stephanie Rosenkranz; Utz Weitzel
Abstract: In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyse the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players? decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as being trustful. We argue that the cooperative aspect relates to incentives while the trustful (and thus non-calculative) aspect of the decision is related to the framing of the situation.
Keywords: alliances; cooperation; focal points; framing; trust
JEL Codes: C72; D74; D80; Z13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| trust (G21) | cooperative behavior (C71) |
| trust (G21) | incentives for cooperation (C71) |
| trust (G21) | selection device among equilibria (C62) |
| self-interest (F52) | cooperative behavior (C71) |
| expectations of player actions (D84) | cooperative behavior (C71) |
| trust (G21) | cooperation (P13) |